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A 鈥渟lack and complicit鈥� testing and certification industry should take more blame for allowing combustible materials to be fitted to Grenfell tower than the project team which worked on the block鈥檚 disastrous refurbishment, the inquiry into the fire has heard.

Marcus Taverner QC, representing main contractor Rydon, said that testing houses and certifying bodies had given 鈥渁ssistance鈥� to manufacturers of dangerous cladding products to exploit an 鈥渋nadequate regulatory regime鈥�.

The inquiry has already found that the ACM cladding panels manufactured by Arconic were the 鈥減rimary cause鈥� for the rapid spread of flames up the side of the tower in the June 2017 fire which claimed 72 lives. The inquiry also found that the insulation products manufactured by Kingspan and Celotex had 鈥渕ore likely than not鈥� contributed to the spread of flames.

In his closing statement for the modules of the inquiry looking into the refurbishment of the tower and the materials which were used, Taverner argued that the role played by the manufacturers of the cladding products and the testing and certifying bodies could not be ignored.

He said that 鈥渋nadequately drafted regulations and guidance鈥� and product manufacturers鈥� 鈥渃ynical and cavalier approach to the serious risks posed by their products鈥� were the main causes of the tragedy.

However, the inquiry heard last year that a consultant advising the client for the refurbishment had complained that he had never 鈥渨orked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance鈥�.

In a 2016 email, Neil Reed of Artelia Projects told a colleague that Rydon鈥檚 refurbishment was 鈥渂ecoming a farce鈥� after the contractor removed staff off the project in the run-up to completion.

And Rydon contracts manager for the project Simon Lawrence admitted it should have hired more design expertise when asked what he would have done differently in hindsight.

But Taverner said the role played by Rydon in the causes of the fire was less important than that played by others.

Listing the factors which led to the fire in a 鈥渓ogical order鈥�, he put building regulations in first place, followed by 鈥渄ishonest鈥� product manufacturers 鈥渋ntent on marketing what they knew to be dangerous material for inappropriate use鈥�.

Taverner said the next highest share of the blame should be given to the testing and certification industry, which he said had wrongly headlined combustible materials as safe for use above 18 metres.

Finally, he listed an 鈥渁larming widespread ignorance鈥� of the dangers of those products due to 鈥減oor professional education and dissemination to the right people of reliable information鈥�.

The fact that identical or similar materials had been installed in hundreds of other buildings across the UK and worldwide was evidence that these four factors were the 鈥渞oot cause鈥� of the disaster, Taverner added.

He highlighted Judith Hackitt鈥檚 interim report into the fire, which concluded that building regulations and guidance was 鈥渢oo complex and unclear鈥�.

The report said that the rules could lead to 鈥渃onfusion and misinterpretation in their application to high-rise and complex buildings鈥�.

The inquiry has already heard how certification body the British Board of Agrement had renewed a certificate for Arconic鈥檚 combustible ACM panels, which were used in the tower鈥檚 cladding system, based on information on the supplier鈥檚 website.

The certificate, which marked the panels as safe for use above 18m, was renewed by the BBA after Arconic had ignored at least 11 requests for new information over more than a year which would affect the fire rating of the certificate.

Arconic never told the BBA that the fire rating of the Reynobond PE panels had been downgraded by a French testing house in 2014, meaning they were deemed unsafe for use above 18m.

The BBA only became aware of the new test data when contacted by BBC journalist in 2018, a year after the fire.

Stephanie Barwise QC, representing some of the bereaved, called the BBA a 鈥渉opelessly weak institution鈥� on Monday.

She said the body was 鈥渢oo willing to please commercial clients at the expense of ensuring appropriate safety standards鈥�.

BBA chief scientific officer John Albon admitted to the inquiry earlier this year that the BBA鈥檚 failure to insist on the information from Arconic was 鈥渁 very basic failure of due diligence鈥�.

But he added that the body鈥檚 procedure had not anticipated 鈥渄eliberate misrepresentation of the performance of the product with a fire safety-critical aspect of performance such as this鈥�.

The inquiry has also heard how Arconic manager Claude Wehrle warned colleagues two years before the fire that Reynobond PE was 鈥渄angerous鈥� and should be swapped for a safer fire-retardant version 鈥渁s a matter of urgency鈥�.

And the firm was warned as early as 2007 that the panels could be deadly after marketing manager Gerard Sonntag attended an industry event where a cladding expert had said that 5,000m2 of ACM would have the same 鈥渇uel power鈥� as a 鈥渢ruck of 19,000-litre oil鈥� in the event of a fire.

The next module of the inquiry will focus on how central and local government responded to the disaster.