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A former senior civil servant has expressed his 鈥渄eep regret鈥� that the government did not revise building regulations following warnings over the widespread use of combustible cladding in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire.

Bob Ledsome, former deputy director of building regulations, told the inquiry into the 2017 blaze that the issues 鈥渟hould have been gripped better鈥� by the Department of Communities and Local Government.

Yesterday, Ledsome was shown a January 2016 email exchange between Brian Martin, the civil servant responsible for fire safety regulations in buildings, and Nick Jenkins of cladding firm Euroclad.

In the email, which was first shown to the inquiry last year, Jenkins told Martin that there were many high rise buildings in the UK that contained ACM panels 鈥渁nd their numbers are growing鈥�, adding: 鈥淚 do think the situation is of grave concern鈥�.

Jenkins also called for a 鈥渓ess ambiguous鈥� statement of fire regulations for external walls following a series of fires caused by ACM, the type of cladding which has been blamed for the rapid spread of flame at Grenfell.

Ledsome, who accepted that the email flagged a 鈥渞ed alert鈥� situation that required 鈥渦rgent consideration鈥�, told counsel to the inquiry Richard Millett QC that he could 鈥渘ot recall鈥� Martin ever sharing this exchange with him.

Millett asked: 鈥淐an you think of a reason why Mr Martin would have kept this red鈭抙ot information, even assuming it was new to him, to himself?鈥�

Ledsome said it would be 鈥渨rong of me to try and speculate鈥�.

The inquiry has already heard that Martin had attended a meeting with industry experts in 2014 where he had been warned about an ambiguous passage in building regulations that was being misinterpreted by many construction professionals.

It stated that 鈥渇iller鈥� materials in a cladding system must meet the tough fire rating of 鈥渓imited combustibility鈥�, but because the passage came under the heading 鈥淚nsulation materials/products鈥�, many in the industry believed it only referred to insulation rather than cladding panels.

At the meeting, Martin had agreed that an explainer of the term 鈥渇iller鈥� should be drafted and published on the government鈥檚 website. He is also alleged to have said 鈥渢here is going to be a major fire鈥� as he left the meeting.

But in his response to Jenkins, Martin said: 鈥淚鈥檓 not sure the text is really all that ambiguous, given that it must cover all forms [of] construction. People often argue that it isn鈥檛 clear when they are trying to justify doing something that is clearly wrong.鈥�

> Also read: Lead fire safety official described ACM panels as going 鈥渨hoosh!鈥� when ignited

Jenkins had also asked Martin to set up a meeting with industry experts to discuss the passage on 鈥渇iller鈥�. Martin responded by suggesting Jenkins attend a meeting on cladding and fire safety run by Bath University.

Millett asked Ledsome if he accepted that Jenkins suggestion of a meeting and a clarification of the passage on 鈥渇iller鈥� was not 鈥渁cted upon by the department at all at any time before the fire at Grenfell Tower?鈥� 

Ledsome replied that it was a 鈥渕atter of fact鈥� that the department had not issued any further guidance on the passage.

Millett asked: 鈥淎re you able to explain why the department didn鈥檛 take this problem by the scruff of the neck, have a meeting with Nick Jenkins, work out what the real problem was and work out how widespread it was, take the initiative and take matters forward, as opposed to leaving it to Mr Jenkins and industry bodies to talk about?鈥�

鈥淚 absolutely accept that it should have been gripped better, and that is a matter of deep regret鈥�, Ledsome said. 

He added that he assumed it had been expected that the issue would be addressed in an ongoing review of building regulations being carried out by the department.

But the inquiry has heard that this review, which was prompted by an investigation into the 2009 Lakanal fire in Camberwell, London, which killed six people after the building鈥檚 combustible cladding panels resulted in rapid flame spread, had been seriously delayed.

Hearings have been told that, by the time of the Grenfell fire, almost no progress on the review had been made since it started in 2013, partly because it had been repeatedly expanded and had become bogged down by departmental requirements to cut red tape.

The inquiry continues.