好色先生TV

In 2009, a small fire broke out inside the 14-storey Lakanal House in south London. The flames spread outside to the residential block鈥檚 combustible cladding panels, which then ignited with a speed and ferocity that left firefighters puzzled. The resulting blaze killed six people, including three children. At the time it was the UK鈥檚 worst fire in a tower block.

Nearly eight years later, this disaster was dwarfed by the fire at Grenfell Tower in June 2017. Just as at Lakanal House, a small internal fire catastrophically escalated when it spread to the building鈥檚 combustible cladding 鈥� except at Grenfell it engulfed almost the entire 24-storey building and killed 72 people.

The cladding panels used on Grenfell had been specified by construction professionals for a refurbishment of the block in 2014, more than five years after Lakanal. Despite a review of building regulations launched in response to the latter, the rules were unchanged by the time of the Grenfell fire. Meanwhile, hundreds of tall residential blocks across the UK had been fitted with combustible materials, creating a safety crisis that is costing the government 鈥� and industry 鈥� billions of pounds to remedy.

Over the past month, the Grenfell Inquiry has seen a roll-call of senior government figures asked to explain how this had happened. Key figures who have provided evidence included Eric Pickles, housing secretary between 2010 and 2015, and former ministers Brandon Lewis, Gavin Barwell and Stephen Williams. Other significant witnesses have included Brian Martin, the civil servant in charge of building regulations for nearly 18 years before the Grenfell fire, and his colleagues Bob Ledsome and Melanie Dawes. It has been the culmination of the phase of the inquiry looking into the causes of the fire, with hearings now set to move on to what happened in the aftermath.

Change that never happened 

A key focus has been the government鈥檚 handling of the review of building regulations in the years leading up to the Grenfell fire. In 2013, the findings of an inquest into the Lakanal House fire included recommendations that the government should amend a small section to clarify the risk of external fire spread. But almost no progress had been made by the time of the Grenfell fire aside from some preparatory research, and the building regulations were not updated to explicitly ban combustible cladding panels until December 2018. 

Dawes, a former permanent secretary of the then Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), said the recommendations had not been considered 鈥減articularly important for public safety鈥�. This, she said, was because officials in charge of the regulations had deemed the coroner Frances Kirkham鈥檚 advice 鈥渘ot particularly well-written鈥� and were 鈥減robably a little bit dismissive of them鈥�. 

It was said that I shouldn鈥檛 worry, there wasn鈥檛 any real issue in terms of safety, people know these kinds of thing

Eric Pickles, housing secretary between 2010 and 2015

Martin, who was so well acquainted with the rules that he likened them to his 鈥渢hird child鈥�, had also said the expert witness who had advised Kirkham had been 鈥渃onfused and conflicted鈥� and so it was 鈥渦nsurprising鈥� that the coroner had asked for the rules to be clarified. Pickles said this had 鈥渃ertainly affected鈥� his judgment in terms of the importance of following the recommendations. 

鈥淚t was said that I shouldn鈥檛 worry, there wasn鈥檛 any real issue in terms of safety, people know these kinds of things,鈥� the former secretary of state added. Nevertheless, the government had agreed to implement the review.

But it soon ran into problems, partly caused by a drive for deregulation during the coalition government under prime minister David Cameron. In 2011, the Cabinet Office introduced the 鈥渞ed tape challenge鈥�, which restricted departments to only adding new regulations if they removed existing ones. This 鈥渙ne in, one out鈥� policy, which was intended to stimulate the economy in the wake of the financial crisis, was strengthened to 鈥渙ne in, two out鈥� in 2013 and 鈥渙ne in, three out鈥� in 2016. It meant that the job of amending regulations became enormously complicated, as officials needed to balance any additions by selecting which rules had to be cut.

Partly because of this, the amendment of a small section of official guidance recommended by Kirkham was expanded to include a review of the entire 300-page Approved Document B, the part of building regulations that deals with fire safety. It was then expanded further to encompass a wider review of building regulations, a process which would take years.

Barwell, the housing minister between 2016 and 2017, told the inquiry that there had been a 鈥渃lear presumption鈥� that the review into building regulations was not 鈥渓ife safety critical鈥� because it had been wrapped into a much longer-term piece of work. He also said he had been 鈥渃omforted鈥� by figures shown to him by officials which showed that the number of fatalities from fires had been steadily falling for 30 years.

In this environment, evidence suggests that the urgency of Kirkham鈥檚 recommendations had been lost. A set of research documents underpinning changes to the regulations which had been delivered to the department in March 2015 was not published until February 2019, a delay which Barwell admitted was 鈥渁bsurd鈥�. 

Martin said that his team had 鈥渞eally struggled to get anything done鈥� within the department because regulation was seen as a 鈥渄irty word鈥�. He suggested that political disruption following the 2016 Brexit vote had made it even harder to get 鈥渁ny kind of traction鈥� with proposals for regulatory changes. 

Drive for deregulation

So why did officials not ask for fire regulations to be exempt from the drive for deregulation, given that they were a matter of life safety? Ledsome, the former deputy director of building regulations, said that neither he nor any of his colleagues had done this because he did not think it was a 鈥渇ight worth having鈥�. 

Pickles said his reaction was 鈥渋ntense impatience鈥� when shown this evidence. He told the inqury this month: 鈥淚鈥檓 not saying I would have agreed with Mr Ledsome. But I think I鈥檓 entitled to have had a chance to do the right thing or do the stupid thing.鈥� 

Ledsome had said he would have had to persuade Pickles to make the case to then-business secretary Vince Cable, who was responsible for decisions on regulating industry. There would have been an 鈥渆normous amount of horse-trading鈥�, Pickles admitted, but he added: 鈥淵ou don鈥檛 help the politician to take a decision unless you confront them with the reality.鈥�

But the former minister admitted that he himself was in favour of deregulation at the time. 鈥淥f course I wanted to deregulate,鈥� he said. Asked if he was aware that officials felt they were working in a policy environment where regulatory intervention was seen as a last resort, he said: 鈥淲ell, that isn鈥檛 a bad thing, is it? To have a system where鈥� we鈥檙e not going to jump straight into regulation, that strikes me as being a good thing.鈥� 

He also said that claims that deregulation had restricted efforts to toughen up fire safety guidance were 鈥渓udicrous鈥�, as he had believed they were, in fact, exempt. Asked if he could explain how his officials seemed to have been 鈥渓abouring under a misapprehension鈥�, Pickles said they had been 鈥渕aking assumptions鈥�.

Counsel to the inquiry Richard Millett QC offered another explanation 鈥� that Pickles had been 鈥渟pectacularly out of touch鈥� with his own department and was now seeking to 鈥渞ecast [the] narrative and to underplay what was in truth an enthusiasm by your government for a deregulatory agenda which led to a complete absence of proper checks and balances so far as concerns life safety.鈥� 

Pickles said this was 鈥渦nkind鈥�, adding: 鈥淲ithout getting terribly emotional, I swore on the bloody Bible. I鈥檓 a Christian. I wouldn鈥檛 come here to鈥� try and just remove responsibility. These things are important to me.鈥�

Warning signs ignored

During this period, the department had been warned repeatedly by the all-party parliamentary group (APPG) on fire safety that the building regulations were flawed and required 鈥渋mmediate attention鈥�. The APPG had sent a series of lengthy letters to housing ministers over several years calling for fire safety guidance to be made tougher, but had become increasingly frustrated by a lack of action in the department. 

Barwell had declined a meeting with the APPG in October 2016, something he said he now 鈥渄eeply regrets鈥�. He later agreed to a meeting in March 2017, against the advice of his officials, but this never happened because of that year鈥檚 snap general election, at which he lost his seat.

Officials had been aware of concerns about the regulations among industry professionals for several years. In July 2014, Martin had attended a meeting of cladding experts called by the Centre for Windows and Cladding Technology (CWCT), an industry body, to discuss concerns over an ambiguous passage in the official fire safety guidance. The passage appeared to imply that the requirement for the tough fire standard of 鈥渓imited combustibility鈥� in cladding systems only applied to 鈥渇iller鈥� materials. 

The inquiry heard that this term, which had been inserted by Martin and his colleagues in 2006, was a last-minute addition and had not been consulted on with the construction industry. It was also contained under the heading 鈥淚nsulation Materials/Products鈥�, leading many professionals to conclude that it only referred to insulation products and not cladding panels. It meant that ACM panels, which contain a highly combustible plastic core and were the type used for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, were seen by some as permitted by the guidance.

It was a problem which was really peculiar to ACM, and I just didn鈥檛 think it was that significant an issue at the time

Brian Martin, civil servant in charge of building regulations in the years prior to the Grenfell fire

Millett said this had resulted in a 鈥�10-year legacy of misunderstanding by the UK construction industry鈥� because of the 鈥減oorly drafted鈥� clause in the regulations. Martin, despite minutes from the meeting with the CWCT showing that he agreed that the wording was 鈥渘ot clear鈥�, has insisted at hearings that the term also referred to the core of cladding panels like ACM.

The government also stuck to this line when details about the passage first emerged in the press in the days after the Grenfell fire, with the inquiry hearing that Martin had emailed product testing body the 好色先生TV Research Establishment (BRE) with a 鈥減re-prepared script鈥� to use for a defence of the regulations.

After the CWCT meeting, it was agreed that Martin and the BRE would draft a clarification of the word 鈥渇iller鈥� to be published on the government鈥檚 website in the form of a 鈥渇requently asked question鈥� (FAQ). But the clarification was never published, and the passage in the guidance was unchanged until 2018. The timing of the meeting was significant, as it came months before the project team working on the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower decided to use ACM panels in the cladding system. 

Martin, who the inquiry heard was the person to whom 鈥渆veryone would turn鈥� at the housing department for advice on fire safety issues, said he had decided to wait for the experts who attended the meeting to contact him with proposals. This does not appear to have happened, and Martin said he then 鈥減robably forgot about it鈥� as it had been a 鈥渂usy time鈥�. 

His colleagues, Anthony Burd, Ledsome and Richard Harral, have all told the inquiry that issuing the FAQ was not a difficult piece of work and could easily have been done by the fire safety team in the department. Martin also accepted that there was nothing 鈥渦nreasonable or inappropriate or disproportionately difficult鈥� in publishing the FAQ.

Growing concerns over ACM panels 

Asked if the reason he had done nothing to clarify the passage was because he did not consider there was any risk of a major fire in England and Wales due to the use of ACM panels, Martin admitted that he 鈥渃ompletely underestimated the hazard鈥� and would have put more time into the issue if he had 鈥渇ully understood it鈥�. He also said he had not raised the lack of clarity in the guidance on ACM with any other senior official at the time, admitting: 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think I recognised how serious it was. It was a problem which was really peculiar to ACM, and I just didn鈥檛 think it was that significant an issue at the time.鈥�

Two years later, Martin was warned again about what was unfolding in the construction industry. In 2016, he was sent an email from cladding professional Nick Jenkins which warned of 鈥済rave concern鈥� that the number of tall buildings in the UK fitted with ACM cladding was 鈥渕any and growing鈥�. Martin responded by saying that fire caused by ACM 鈥渟houldn鈥檛 be a problem in the UK鈥� because the building regulations were 鈥渄esigned to prevent this鈥�.

The department continued to receive warnings about ACM right up until the Grenfell fire. In April 2017, two months before the fire, the London Fire Brigade (LFB) sent a letter saying that it was 鈥渄eeply concerned鈥� about blocks of flats and other buildings including schools. Commissioner Dany Cotton said the LFB had discovered at least one property each month since the beginning of the year with 鈥渟ignificant鈥� fire safety issues, and that it was 鈥渟afe to assume that there are many other cases that do not come to our attention, yet are placing the residents of those properties in significant risk鈥�. 

[There was] progressive decay in the construction industry, the progressive decay that went alongside it in the building control world, the impact of government policy on regulation

Brian Martin

Cotton also said that the LFB was 鈥渃oncerned about contractor competency鈥� and asked to discuss wider issues in relation to the quality of housing. Barwell said he found the letter to be 鈥渢he most disturbing鈥� of all the evidence shown to him at the inquiry. But he did not receive it at the time because he had been campaigning for the election. The Grenfell Tower fire occurred on 14 June, just six days after the election concluded. 

Evidence provided over the past month would suggest that a combination of deregulatory policies designed to jump-start the sluggish post-recession economy and a complacency about fire safety because of the falling numbers of fire deaths played a role in allowing the Grenfell fire to happen. Austerity-era cuts were also a factor, with Martin saying he had been left as a 鈥渟ingle point of failure鈥� in an under-resourced department. But this phase of the inquiry has shed light on many things happening at the same time in the years leading up to the fire. 

Asked why it took the Grenfell Tower disaster for the dangers of ACM cladding to be fully appreciated, Martin said that it was the 鈥減rogressive decay in the construction industry, the progressive decay that went alongside it in the building control world, the impact of government policy on regulation and the resources available to try and address these risks鈥�.

All of this has played out against the backdrop of housing secretary Michael Gove鈥檚 campaign to get developers and product manufacturers to pay into a 拢4bn fund for cladding remediation costs for which, he says, the industry shares responsibility. But, with five modules of the inquiry still to go, as well as a police investigation, it is far too early to draw conclusions about where exactly that responsibility rests. 

What is safe to assume is that the evidence heard in recent weeks is adding to the argument that firms had been operating within the regulatory environment set by ministers. The timing of Gove鈥檚 threats to hold housebuilders and manufacturers to account through the 好色先生TV Safety Bill could be seen by some as rather convenient for the government.