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Disclosures from current and former staff at materials giants Celotex, Kingspan and Arconic, as well as certification body the British Board of Agr茅ment (BBA) and testing house BRE, have raised alarming questions about weaknesses in the testing and certification of construction products.

Module two of the second phase of the Grenfell inquiry has heard how some products which have been installed on buildings across the UK for well over a decade have been marketed as safe based on dubious and often deliberately misleading test evidence. 

The second phase of the inquiry鈥檚 second module wrapped up at the end of last month. This module, which focused on the production, testing and sale of the materials that were installed on Grenfell Tower prior to the June 2017 fire which claimed 72 lives, has had a profound impact on the wider construction industry.

Some of the headlines the inquiry has generated since this module began last November have become common knowledge among construction professionals. Others, which have surfaced after the initial shock of Celotex and Kingspan鈥檚 disclosures last year, may be less well known. To put the whole module into context, here is a summary of the evidence.

Celotex rebranded combustible insulation product as safe for use on buildings above 18m by rigging fire test

The inquiry heard in November how, in 2014, Celotex had changed the name of one of its insulation products which had failed the fire test needed for use above 18m and rigged a new test to ensure that it passed. It did this by adding fire-resisting magnesium oxide boards to the test rig and reducing the size of ventilation gaps between panels to restrict the spread of flames. 

Former Celotex product manager Jonathan Roper, who was given the job of developing the 鈥渘ew鈥� product, was 23 at the time, had no technical experience, received no training in building regulations, and was working in his first job since finishing university. He admitted that he had realised at the time that rigging the test was a 鈥渇raud on the market鈥� and said the actions of Celotex had been 鈥渃ompletely unethical鈥�.

The hearings were told how the decision to rig the test was made by senior managers to drive up the firm鈥檚 share price to achieve a lucrative sale of the business. The firm had also been set a target to increase profit by 15% after it was purchased by French multinational Saint Gobain in 2012.

Following the test, Roper gave a presentation on how to market the insulation to a board meeting in which he said that 鈥渘obody understands the test requirements鈥� and that building control had 鈥渉ugely differing levels of understanding鈥� on fire safety requirements.

He then told the inquiry how he had deliberately not corrected a mistake by a building control officer from the Local Authority 好色先生TV Control (LABC) who had confused the Class 0 fire rating with the concept of 鈥渓imited combustibility鈥�. Roper then emailed some suggested wording for a certificate for the insulation to the LABC, which appeared to have been copied and pasted directly into the final certificate complete with a typo from Roper鈥檚 email.

Kingspan marketed insulation product as safe for use above 18m for nearly 15 years based on test report of different product

Next to give evidence was Kingspan, which admitted prior to the hearings in October last year in a letter to BRE that it had been marketing its K15 insulation using a 2005 test report of an older, chemically different version of the product.

The hearings were told that this version had been changed in 2006 to a newer version which was 鈥渜uicker and more cost-effective to produce鈥�.

Despite the firm claiming in its letter that it was 鈥渘ow of the view鈥� that there were differences between the product that was tested and what had been sold on the market, former technical project manager Ivor Meredith told the inquiry that the differences had been 鈥渃ommon knowledge鈥� at the firm since the product was altered.

After a 2007 test of the new version had turned the rig into a 鈥渞aging inferno鈥� within 17 minutes which had to be extinguished because of fears that it would set fire to the laboratory, Meredith said he had sent a 鈥渧ery animated鈥� report to his superiors. Despite the test鈥檚 dramatic failure, he said that he could not recall 鈥渁ny real sort of shock鈥�.

The inquiry then heard how technical manager Philip Heath had said facade engineering consultant Wintech could 鈥済o f鈥�#ck themselves, and if they are not careful we鈥檒l sue the a鈥�#se of [sic] them鈥� after the firm had raised concerns about the product. 

The hearings were also told that Kingspan staff had reassured worried contractors by sending them test results of a trial product containing different chemicals to what was being sold on the market. 

And the inquiry was shown texts between technical staff discussing the testing of K15 in which one stated that the product鈥檚 marketing literature was 鈥渁ll lies鈥�, adding: 鈥淎lls [sic] we do is lie in here.鈥�

Arconic knew ACM cladding panels would burn 10 years before the Fire but did not withdraw them due to 鈥渃ost implications鈥�

Hearings resumed in February after a gap of nearly two months because of a positive covid-19 test on the inquiry team and the imposition of a third national lockdown in January.

The focus turned to Arconic, which had supplied the Grenfell Tower refurbishment project team with 3,000m虏 of the ACM cladding panels which the first phase of the inquiry had found to be the 鈥減rimary cause鈥� of the rapid spread of flames up the side of the building.

Despite being warned as early as 2007 that 5,000m虏 of ACM would have the same 鈥渇uel power鈥� as a 19,000 litre truck of oil in a fire, the firm continued selling the panels until 2017. It only halted supply on 26 June of that year, 12 days after the Grenfell Tower fire.

Five days before the panels were withdrawn, the firm鈥檚 former sales manager Deborah French admitted in a secretly recorded phone conversation that Arconic had continued selling them because of the 鈥渃ost implications鈥� of removing them from the market.

The firm had been selling two versions of the product, one designed to be folded into cassettes and another designed to be installed with rivets. While the riveted form had achieved a Euroclass B rating, allowing it to be used above 18m, the cassette form 鈥� the type used on Grenfell Tower 鈥� had failed the test 鈥渄isastrously鈥�.

But Arconic only supplied the test results of the riveted form to the BBA, which then issued a certificate giving both types a Euroclass B rating. 

The firm鈥檚 president denied that this had been 鈥渄eliberate concealment鈥�, insisting that the BBA 鈥渃ould have found out鈥� about the test on the cassettes in an audit.

BRE was warned about Kingspan鈥檚 misuse of test reports four years before the fire

Next in the spotlight was former government-run testing house, BRE, which was privatised in 1997.

The organisation鈥檚 current director of fire testing and certification Stephen Howard was asked why he had failed to take any action after being warned in 2013 about Kingspan鈥檚 misuse of a 2005 fire test to sell its K15 insulation for high rise buildings.

Asked by then Celotex product manager Jonathan Roper how Kingspan had been able to market K15 for a wide variety of applications not covered by its test report, Howard replied that the onus was on the building owner and building control to ensure the system was compliant, signing off by telling Roper: 鈥淚 am not sure that I have much more to add.鈥� 

BRE former burn hall manager Philip Clark also claimed that manufacturers of combustible materials could 鈥渟neak鈥� extra components onto test rigs without inspectors knowing.

Clark, who told the inquiry that 鈥渢he reliance was very much on the honesty of the client鈥� and said there was a 鈥渓arge element of trust in everything we do鈥�, denied being aware that Celotex had rigged its 2014 fire test, blaming the oversight on the burn hall being a 鈥渂usy place鈥�.

And former project manager Tony Baker admitted to a 鈥渧ery basic error鈥� by not noticing the magnesium boards which Celotex staff fixed to the rig to reduce the spread of flames.

The BBA based certificate for ACM panels installed on tower on information on Arconic鈥檚 website

Leading UK certifier the BBA used incomplete test data and information on Arconic鈥檚 website to renew a certificate clearing the firm鈥檚 highly combustible cladding panels for use above 18m.

Former BBA project manager Valentina Amoroso admitted making the decision after Arconic had avoided sending her the required test data for 15 months, emailing the firm that she would go ahead with the data that was available because of 鈥渟evere delays in closing this review job鈥�.

The body鈥檚 former deputy chief executive also told the inquiry that it may have based the fire rating for Kingspan鈥檚 K15 insulation on tests of different products. Brian Moore said that it was 鈥渕ore likely than not鈥� that the classification had been 鈥渆xtrapolated鈥� from test reports on other phenolic foam products dating as far back as 1991. He added that despite the practice being 鈥渘ot unusual鈥� at the BBA, he couldn鈥檛 be certain whether it is permitted under UK fire regulations.