好色先生TV

 

Originally planned to open just before last Christmas, London鈥檚 Crossrail 拢15bn megaproject is now running about 拢2bn over budget and more than a year late. Oh, and by the by, the man running it 鈥� Mark Wild, its third chief executive in the last year 鈥� says staff morale has fallen 鈥渙ff the cliff鈥� and he doesn鈥檛 know when it鈥檒l be finished.

When Crossrail announced it would miss its December opening date, blame for the delays was put principally on the complex signalling systems needed to ensure the safe running of the new trains. However, newly released documents and public testimony by current and former executives paint a picture that is altogether more damning for UK construction 鈥� of half-built stations, no agreed completion dates and productivity through the floor.

Given the sensitivity of the project, and the fact so many firms are on Crossrail鈥檚 payroll, it is hard to find people involved in the scheme who are willing to discuss these problems in public. However, 好色先生TV has spoken to a number anonymously, including a senior source on the project itself. So, what light has this shed on what really happened on Crossrail, and what does it all mean for UK construction?

Also read: Crossrail - still waiting at the platform

Also read: Crossrail - how the delay unfolded

Civils strife

Since the costly delays were revealed last year, much of the focus has been on who said exactly what to whom, and when 鈥� with former chair Sir Terry Morgan and mayor Sadiq Khan descending into an unedifying spat over whether the mayor knew of the delay before August 2018 (see Morgan vs Khan: who said what). But many think this debate is missing the bigger issue of what actually went wrong 鈥� and why it seemingly took managers so long to recognise it. Stan Hornagold, project manager and former programme director on the London Underground public-private partnership, says: 鈥淲hether the mayor was told in July or August is neither here nor there. It鈥檚 ridiculous. Either date is about a year too late.鈥�

The stations are the big problem. I can鈥檛 see how this can be delivered in calendar year 2019, and I don鈥檛 know when it will be after that

Mark Wild, Crossrail

Initially, the main civil engineering works on Crossrail, begun in 2010, appear to have gone well. However, as the complex M&E equipment began to be installed problems were encountered, such as at Paddington station, where equipment had to be taken out and replaced. As previously reported by 好色先生TV back in February 2017, construction union Unite branded Crossrail the 鈥渉okey cokey line鈥� because of equipment going in only to be taken out. Bernard McAuley, national officer for Unite, described the project as 鈥渋n meltdown鈥� and productivity as 鈥渋n pieces鈥� as early as January 2017. But Crossrail maintained the official line that the project as a whole was on time and on budget.

A senior project source told 好色先生TV last week: 鈥淎 lot of the work on Crossrail has been absolutely brilliant. But because it was very successful in the early stages, a myth built up. I think it was decided that this reputation was absolutely crucial, meaning the on-time, on-budget mantra was carried on long beyond when it should have done.鈥�

From testimony given since the announcement of the delay, and documents released by Transport for London under pressure from the London Assembly, it is now possible to see that these civils delays, combined with delays in delivering the trains themselves, resulted in the signalling installation, integration and testing programme being severely squeezed to keep to the opening date.

A letter from Juergen Maier, chief executive of signalling contractor Siemens, to Transport for London鈥檚 commissioner Mike Brown last February, made clear that problems besetting 鈥渃ivils and energisation contractors鈥� had delayed the installation of the signalling system by a year. Meanwhile an 18-month delay to the trains meant, he said, 鈥渢he available testing window has reduced from 18 to five months鈥�.

Moreover, Maier set out his fears of 鈥渃ompletely missing鈥� the December opening date, and said that the time had come for 鈥渃omplete openness鈥� 鈥� a call seemingly not heeded for another six months.

Maier鈥檚 letter is corroborated by the testimony of ex-chair Morgan, who says work on the Paddington and Bond Street stations was the 鈥渕ost challenging鈥�. The squeezed testing timetable meant taking civils contractors off the project to allow trains to run through the tunnels 鈥� with a programme of five days of construction and two of testing brought in. But with much construction work still to be done, and little success on the testing side, Morgan said this attempt simply 鈥渃ompromised the construction work as a consequence鈥�.

Warning signs

The senior project source says: 鈥淭he critical thing to understand is that the signalling systems and testing problems and civils delays are totally interrelated. Because of the civils delays, the decision was taken to compress the testing and installation of the signals at the end of the programme. But the signalling installation isn鈥檛 possible when you鈥檙e doing dynamic train testing.鈥�

The result, the source says, was that: 鈥淭he warning signs were there 18 months ago. And actually most people on the ground knew that the opening date wasn鈥檛 realistic. At the latest the dynamic train testing should have begun in early 2018. When it didn鈥檛, it should have been pretty clear.鈥�

Amid the clear signs of problems, the performance of US consultant Jacobs in its role as project representative (known as the P Rep) 鈥� supposedly the eyes and ears of Crossrail鈥檚 joint sponsors, Transport for London and the Department for Transport, on the project 鈥� has been sharply scrutinised. In May, Jacobs reported back to the joint sponsor board that the project was under pressure and up to 拢400m in additional funding was needed 鈥� but did not conclude the delivery date was in jeopardy.

David Hughes, strategy director at Transport for London (TfL) and a member of the Crossrail sponsor board, told the TfL board in January that auditor KPMG was 鈥渞ight to identify shortcomings in the [project representative] performance in this period鈥�, while Crossrail chair Tony Meggs told the same meeting he was 鈥渄isappointed鈥� with the P Rep鈥檚 reports, which were 鈥渕ore reporting than challenging鈥�.

The evidence suggests it wasn鈥檛 only Jacobs that wasn鈥檛 joining up the dots. KPMG鈥檚 report into the problems, commissioned when the delay was announced last summer, shows that as late as June last year, Crossrail鈥檚 own report to the joint sponsor board rated the December opening date as 鈥済reen鈥� 鈥� not at risk 鈥� despite the fact it flagged 25 individual 鈥渁mber鈥� and 鈥渞ed鈥� warnings on specific parts of the project, in areas including dynamic testing, trial running and infrastructure provision. TfL鈥檚 Hughes added: 鈥淚n defence of the P Rep I think they were reliant on the information and reporting they were getting, which as we now know, was telling a very misleading picture.鈥�

Jacobs declined to comment.

The result, KPMG found, of this failure to recognise the problems earlier, was that Crossrail started effectively winding down parts of the organisation over the summer ready for completion 鈥� action that made it harder to turn around the performance when the delay was ultimately admitted.

Why the dots weren鈥檛 joined is, so far, simply a matter for speculation. Hornagold says: 鈥淵ou can be sure that the answers will have been in the project team all along. There can be a variety of motives, if senior management didn鈥檛 know, that those below them were not telling them. Often, people just like a quiet life.鈥�

One senior industry figure involved in the 2012 Olympic infrastructure build says: 鈥淚t seems like people were hearing what they wanted to hear, and taking an over-optimistic view that they could pull things back. Managers have to create an environment where people are willing to get all the problems out on the table.鈥�

Half-finished

The scale of this failure to join the dots is only just becoming clear, as it emerges quite how far behind the civils work fell as access time was squeezed to allow for testing. Crossrail鈥檚 new chief executive, Wild, told the TfL board in January that currently none of the nine stations in the central section are totally complete, and only at Farringdon and Woolwich have the main contractors got sufficiently close to completion to be able to demobilise their large 鈥渕arching army鈥� of workers. Achieving what Crossrail calls 鈥渟ubstantial demobilisation鈥� on these stations is critical for bringing down the 拢30m weekly cost of the project identified by KPMG in December.

But Wild says this demobilisation won鈥檛 happen on the last of the stations until 鈥淛une-July-August鈥�, and that only in recent weeks has Crossrail actually tied contractors into agreed delivery dates. 鈥淲e鈥檝e worked very hard over the past two months to get contractual buy-in from the tier-one contractors. I think for the first time on Crossrail we have the buy-in from contractors contractually to these dates. It still doesn鈥檛 mean we鈥檒l achieve them; it means we鈥檝e got alignment, which we鈥檝e never had before.

Corroborating Unite鈥檚 2017 allegation, Wild also admits productivity on the central section stations, for which Crossrail is responsible, has been 鈥渓ow鈥� 鈥� having fallen to just 30%-35% of where it should be, while 鈥渙nly half of the installation work is completed at the stations鈥�.

This project will transform people鈥檚 journeys in London and it will be amazing when it finishes. People will forget about these problems when it鈥檚 open

David Higgins, former chair of HS2 and ODA

Hopes and fears

The hope is, of course, that once Crossrail finally opens, the problems building it will be quickly consigned to history. David Higgins, former chair of HS2 and the man who delivered the London 2012 Olympics as chief executive of the Olympic Delivery Authority, says: 鈥淭his project will transform people鈥檚 journeys in London and it will be amazing when it finishes. People will forget about these problems when it鈥檚 open.

鈥淚n 2007 a completion date was picked, and these issues reflect the reality that from that far off it is incredibly difficult to land something as complex as this on a pin.鈥� Likewise, former transport minister, TfL board member and mayoral candidate Steve Norris hopes the public will be forgiving on such a complex scheme: 鈥淚鈥檓 afraid the lesson from major projects almost everywhere in the world is that they overrun.鈥�

Nevertheless, many worry what the impact of all this will be on UK construction鈥檚 reputation for delivery when combined with delays to Tottenham Hotspur鈥檚 new football stadium and reports of rising costs on HS2. One senior engineering source says: 鈥淭his might make the politicians nervous 鈥� no politician wants to be in the position of announcing a major project delay.鈥�

A separate senior contracting source, referring to a yet-to-be-completed Berlin airport on which construction was originally due to finish in 2012, says: 鈥淭he public鈥檚 consent to invest in big projects is based on the idea they鈥檒l be done professionally. If we end up with a Brandenburg airport-style farce, or if HS2 is suddenly 拢100bn, then people could start to say this isn鈥檛 what they signed up to.鈥�

Many in the industry will hope that, whatever Crossrail鈥檚 complexity, its problems can be resolved sooner rather than later.

Also read: Crossrail 鈥榠gnored warnings鈥� scheme would bust deadline
Also read: Crossrail 鈥� still waiting on the platform
Also visit: 好色先生TV鈥檚 Crossrail hub page, with all the latest news and analysis about the project