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When money is no object on a project, it usually turns out that, in the end, it is the builder or the professional team that pays when things go wrong. So it is with much of the work commissioned by public bodies towards the end of this millennium.

The list is endless, from pop music museums to football stadia. Gripped with enthusiasm for their enterprise and gripping the money given to them by other public bodies, groups of trustees, most of whom have no previous experience in development or construction, set out to build, rebuild or extend the buildings that house their various undertakings. When, however, the money runs out and it ends in tears, these trustees confidently expect someone else to pay. That someone is either the project鈥檚 professional advisers or its builders.

These less than provident clients do not seem to realise that neither the professional teams nor the builders involved in these financial disasters have equity in them. Nor have the clients explained to these professionals and builders that they were expected to take risks beyond their contractual obligations. The behaviour of these people trusted with public money is not only unreasonable but downright irresponsible.

Often as not, these trustees are quick to blame the Arts Council that, not before time, has, under business-like control, called a stop to the endless bailing-out of enthusiastic trustees who find themselves short of ready money to pay justly incurred bills.

Although the provident attitude of the Arts Council may well be satisfactory from the taxpayer鈥檚 point of view, it leaves the wretched builders 鈥� and often the professional bodies 鈥� singing for their money.

The problem of course is that the plans for these undertakings are often drawn up champagne-style, whereas the bodies putting up the cash, usually lottery funds paid through the auspices of the Arts Council, provide only beer money.

The gap is often filled by private donations, which on the face of it is a sensible way to proceed. Without doubt, the use of public money to encourage private giving should be welcomed. But welcome too would be a more responsible attitude among trustees to how the money is spent.

The behaviour of these people trusted with public money is not only unreasonable but downright irresponsible

Part of the problem with at least two great projects is that they have not proved to be popular with the public. Both the Royal Armouries in Leeds and the National Museum of Popular Music in Sheffield simply do not have enough visitors. Their income is way below the level that was expected.

Before committing themselves to the liability of a building contract, trustees should take into account the possibility that their venture may fail. The responsibility is theirs; it can only be theirs, as they are placed in these executive positions not for prestige and fun but to oversee the conduct of the organisation that they represent.

Perhaps the wise words of Conrad Hilton might have been worth remembering when the trustees took the decision to locate their museums in Sheffield and Leeds. Hilton, the genius who created the Hilton chain of hotels, often used to say: 鈥漈here are three things that make a successful hotel: position, position, position.鈥� It does not come as any surprise to those who are used to the business of tourism that the Tower of London can encourage vast numbers of people to look at arms and armour, whereas the Royal Armouries in Leeds failed miserably to achieve similar results.

For builders, however, there is only one useful piece of advice, and when I was a young man that advice was given to me by a chief engineer at Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons. The problem I was wrestling with on that occasion was one of a contract that showed a healthy loss. This wise man perused the documents and my arguments. 鈥淧erfect,鈥� he opined, 鈥� perfect. Well, almost perfect. You only made one mistake 鈥� you shouldn鈥檛 have signed the contract.鈥�

Builders and, for that matter, professionals intending to work for trustees in receipt of lottery and Arts Council funds, should study very carefully the competence of their would-be client, as well as the amount of money available. For many of these institutions have only one source of real funding, and these days that source is inclined to say no when asked to finance overruns.