The claimant construction company, Kharafi was the main contractor for airport construction works in Ethiopia. Kharafi engaged Protech as earthworks subcontractor. Kharafi terminated the subcontract before the earthworks were completed and Protech made various claims that were referred to arbitration. The arbitrator made several awards in Protech鈥檚 favour including a substantive award of damages and a costs award.
During the arbitration Protech had mistakenly failed to disclose an agreement whereby Protech had given up the proceeds of its claim against Kharafi to one of its creditors. Kharafi argued that this had the effect of depriving Protech of its standing to advance its claims. Kharafi sought to set aside the arbitration awards pursuant to section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996. Section 68 permits awards to be challenged for 鈥渟erious irregularity鈥 which has caused or will cause 鈥渟ubstantial injustice鈥 to the applicant. Kharafi claimed that the way in which the awards had been procured was 鈥渃ontrary to public policy鈥 and amounted to a 鈥渟erious irregularity鈥 under the 1996 Act.
The Decision
The Honourable Mr Justice Langley upheld previous authority that 鈥渟erious irregularity鈥 and 鈥渟ubstantial injustice鈥 are to be reserved only for extreme cases. On this basis, in order to be contrary to public policy, the conduct complained of should involve more than an unintentional mistake and should, except very exceptionally, involve something that could be described as 鈥渦nconscionable鈥 or 鈥渞eprehensible鈥. Accordingly, the matters on which Kharafi relied, namely unintentional non-disclosure, did not satisfy the public policy test or the requirement of substantial injustice. Kharafi鈥檚 application was therefore refused.
Did Protech鈥檚 accidental failure to disclose a document amount to a 鈥渟erious irregularity鈥 within section 68 of the 1996 Act?
Reference
The Honourable Mr Justice Langley upheld previous authority that 鈥渟erious irregularity鈥 and 鈥渟ubstantial injustice鈥 are to be reserved only for extreme cases. On this basis, in order to be contrary to public policy, the conduct complained of should involve more than an unintentional mistake and should, except very exceptionally, involve something that could be described as 鈥渦nconscionable鈥 or 鈥渞eprehensible鈥. Accordingly, the matters on which Kharafi relied, namely unintentional non-disclosure, did not satisfy the public policy test or the requirement of substantial injustice. Kharafi鈥檚 application was therefore refused.
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*Full case details
Protech Projects Construction (PTY) Ltd vs Mohammed Abdulmohsin Al-Kharafi & Sons For General Trading and Others
High Court of Justice (Queens Bench Division), The Honourable Mr Justice Langley [2005] EWHC 2165 (Comm)
Postscript
There was no basis on which Kharafi could challenge the substantive award that resulted in an award to Protech of a substantial sum. This was because there was nothing inherently wrong with the various agreements entered into by Protech and the non-disclosure, albeit that it should not have occurred, was unintentional. It may have been different if Kharafi had been able to show that non-disclosure was contrived or deliberate on the part of Protech and that this has had caused prejudice to Kharafi. The courts are therefore pragmatic in their approach to applications under section 68 of the 1996 Act and will not entertain applications that seek to dress up as an 鈥渋rregularity鈥 what is really a challenge to the 鈥渃orrectness鈥 of an arbitral decision.