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The government gave no consideration to life safety when publishing 鈥渃onfusing鈥� new guidance for cladding systems in the early 2000s, the Grenfell Inquiry has heard.

Tuesday鈥檚 hearing was told how ministers had started to introduce tougher European standards into British guidance in 2002 with a planned transition period of three years.

During this period, a document was published which the inquiry heard appeared to equate the British 鈥楥lass 0鈥� standard with the harder to achieve European 鈥楥lass B鈥�.

But officials already knew by this point, from fire tests carried out in 2001, that a cladding product which achieved 鈥楥lass 0鈥� might not be able to achieve 鈥楥lass B鈥�.

A test on a cladding system containing ACM that had achieved Class 0 but only the lower European standard of Class D resulted in 20m flames, twice the height of the rig, and had to be extinguished just five minutes into the 30-minute test .

A diagram in official guidance produced in 2002 said that cladding products needed to achieve 鈥渃lass 0 (National Class) or class B鈥� or better鈥�, which inquiry to the counsel Richard Millett QC suggested introduced 鈥渃onfusion鈥� because people might think there was a degree of 鈥渆quivalence鈥� between the two ratings.

Former 好色先生TV Research Establishment managing director Debbie Smith, who gave evidence to the inquiry yesterday, was involved in the drafting of the document.

Smith told the hearing that she was not aware of any confusion at the time, adding that the guidance was 鈥渄iscussed at length and also went out to consultation, and at no point was it raised as a particular problem or, you know, anybody raised any concerns that it was unclear鈥�.

Millett asked if Smith, in light of the 2001 test on ACM, realised that a builder who opted for a 鈥楥lass 0鈥� cladding product - which the guidance permitted - might actually be choosing a European 鈥楥lass D鈥� or 鈥楥lass E鈥� product.

Smith replied: 鈥淲ithin the overall context of what we were doing at the time, yes, that was potentially possible. I mean, I鈥檓 not aware that that was given or I gave that particular consideration at the time.鈥�

Millett asked: 鈥淲as any consideration given to the risks to life presented by leaving class 0 in diagram in this way?鈥� 

Smith said: 鈥淣ot at that time, I don鈥檛 believe, no.鈥�

The inquiry was then shown a technical bulletin produced by Kingspan in May 2003, stamped with the subtitle 鈥淭he plain facts鈥�, which sought to explain the new guidance.

Kingspan鈥檚 combustible K15 insulation was one of the insulation materials found to have been included in the cladding system on Grenfell Tower.

The note claimed that 鈥楥lass 0鈥� 鈥渃orrelates鈥� with European 鈥楥lass B鈥� in the new regime.

Asked if this statement was 鈥渞eliable and accurate鈥�, Smith replied: 鈥淔rom my perspective, no.鈥�

鈥淏ut you can see how industry was reading it, even at this stage, yes? You didn鈥檛 at the time, but you can see how there were鈥�, asked Millett. Smith replied: 鈥淵es.鈥�

The bulletin also claimed that the existing British standards would not be withdrawn for 鈥渇ive to 10鈥� years, despite the government having said that the transition period would be three years.

It added that the government had said it will not implement the tougher European standards 鈥渦ntil the industry is ready to adopt it鈥�.

Smith said she had not heard anything at that time which suggested the government was planning to extend the transition period, admitting that she was surprised to see the claim and that she did not know where Kingspan had got the idea.

Despite the initial plans for a three year transition period, 鈥楥lass 0鈥� was allowed to remain in building safety guidance for a total of 16 years, only being removed in 2018 in the year after the Grenfell Fire claimed 72 lives.

The government has claimed that 鈥楥lass 0鈥� had in fact not been permitted in cladding materials since 2006, when guidance was tweaked to introduce higher fire standards for 鈥榝iller鈥� materials.

But the inquiry has already heard that there was widespread confusion in the industry over the word 鈥榝iller鈥�, which was taken by many to only refer to materials used to fill gaps between insulation rather than cladding panels.

Hearings have also been told that government officials failed to clarify the guidance despite repeated warnings from industry professionals following fires involving combustible cladding systems.

The inquiry continues.